The paper discusses some of the contributions of Duncan Farquharson Gregory and Robert Leslie Ellis to symbolical algebra and their views on the philosophy of mathematics with the aim of revisiting the accepted characterisation of the second generation of reformers of British mathematics found in Crosbie Smith and Norton Wise's seminal Energy and Empire. It is argued that at least some of the features brought to the fore in their treatment of the work of Gregory and Ellis -namely "geometrical methods" in mathematics and "anti-metaphysical", "non-hypothetical" and "practical" knowledge -cannot be straightforwardly upheld. On the one hand, Gregory's generalisation of George Peacock's symbolical algebra was connected to several natural philosophical considerations underlying the Scottish Newtonians' "abstractionism" and "geometrical fluxional analysis". On the other hand, Ellis's idealist philosophy of mathematics and science insisted that the a priori necessary truths of mathematics could inform the "hypothetical part of scientific induction". A more nuanced understanding of the place of the second generation of reformers within the analytical revolution in Victorian Britain should thus take into account the eclectic foundational position that arises from the work of Gregory and Ellis.
It has become commonplace to explain the development of nineteenth-century British mathematics in terms of two main factors. 1 On the one hand, there was the external influence consisting of the re-importation, adoption and dissemination of the "exotic" viewpoints, methods, and techniques of Continental mathematics by members of the Analytical Society, namely Charles Babbage (1791 Babbage ( -1871 , George Peacock (1791 -1858 and John Herschel (1792 -1871 . 2 On the other hand, there was the internal critical reflection of second-generation figures such as William Rowan Hamilton (1805 Hamilton ( -1865 , Augustus De Morgan (1806 -1871 and Duncan Farquharson Gregory (1813 Gregory ( -1844 on the following commitments of the first generation 3 : firstly to the algebraical calculus of functions and power-series of Joseph-Louis Lagrange (1736-1813), instead of the more geometrically inspired calculus of limits associated with Sylvestre Lacroix (1785-1843) and
The present paper critically investigates the general characterisation of the second generation of reformers of British mathematics associated with the CMJ, as put forward in Smith and Wise's Energy and Empire. Through a close analysis of the work of Gregory and Ellis, the paper shows that the labels "geometrical methods" in mathematics and "anti-metaphysical", "non-hypothetical" and "practical" in scientific knowledge cannot straightforwardly be used either to capture the group's orientation or to adequately understand its place within the analytical revolution in Britain during the early nineteenth century. 26 The paper's outline is as follows. After a brief biographical sketch of the lives of Gregory and Ellis (section 1), section 2 describes their contributions to the CMJ and compares the character of the CMJ to the publication of the first generation of mathematical reformers, the Memoirs of the Analytical Society. These two introductory sections set the scene for the critical discussion of the labels "geometrical" (section 3), "anti-metaphysical" (sections 3 and 4) and "non-hypothetical" (section 4). It is by means of showing that the natural philosophical and metaphysically inspired features of Gregory's Scottish Newtonian predecessors' views on "abstractionism" and "geometrical fluxional analysis" played a crucial role in his contributions to (Lagrangian-inspired) symbolical algebra that section 3 explains what in Smith and Wise's account remains a paradoxical fact: namely that it was his indebtedness to his native tradition that allowed Gregory to make progress in mathematics. Section 4 analyses Ellis's "General Preface" to Francis Bacon's philosophical works and his "Evidence" for the Cambridge University Commission in order to show that both his meta-mathematics and philosophy of science were of a Kantian-idealist stripe. This outlook enabled him to combine a "quasi-Lagrangian" mathematics with a revived "Baconian" scientific method. In Ellis there are a priori truths of the mind that underlie mathematical formalisms whose interpretation can inform the new conceptions needed in the creative part of induction. The concluding section suggests that what arises from the work of Gregory and Ellis is a view of the second generation of reformers of British mathematics as a heterogeneous group, with at least some prominent members working within an eclectic ("Baconian-Lagrangian") orientation.
Duncan Farquharson Gregory and Robert Leslie Ellis: intersecting personal and professional lives
The Scottish mathematician and youngest son of the Professor of Medicine and classicist James Gregory (1753 Gregory ( -1821 , Duncan Farquharson Gregory was born in Edinburgh on 13 April 1813. 27 He was a descendant of the famous Gregory family whose claim to recognition in Scottish biography "does not rest on the outstanding genius of any individual member [so] much as on the number of great and brilliant men belonging to it". 28 In three generations the Gregories provided nine professors to the University of St Andrews, King's College (Aberdeen) and the University of Edinburgh. Duncan Gregory was the great-great-grandson of the Professor of Mathematics at St Andrews and Edinburgh James Gregory I (1638 Gregory I ( -1675 , the great-grandson of the Professor of Physics at King's College James Gregory (1674 Gregory ( -1755 and the grandson of John Gregory (1724 Gregory ( -1773 , the Professor of Medicine at Edinburgh and the cousin of the founder of the Scottish School of Common Sense, Thomas Reid (1710 -1796 . 29 Duncan Gregory himself entered Edinburgh Academy in October 1824 and Edinburgh University in 1826, where he became the "favourite pupil of Professor [William] Wallace [1768-1843]" 30 -who, as a mathematician upholding the "traditional Scottish geometrical spirit", 31 was an early exponent of Continental analysis in Britain and translator of French mathematical works. 32 Gregory entered Trinity College in 1833 as an assistant of the Professor of Chemistry, Rev. James Cumming (1777-1861), where he would rank fifth Wrangler in the Tripos examination of 1837. Around 1838 he competed with Philip Kelland (1808-1879) to succeed Wallace as a Professor of Mathematics at Edinburgh University, but despite "the associations of his name [and] the bent of his interests" 33 he lost the chair to Kelland. 34 During his tragically short life -he died on 23 February 1844 at the age of 30 -Gregory worked as one of the Tripos moderators in 1841-1842, and was considered for chairs at Toronto and Glasgow but never obtained a university position. Gregory is best remembered as the founder, together with two other ambitious young wranglers Smith and Greatheed, of the CMJ, a journal that would soon produce "not merely expert algebraists, but sound and original mathematical thinkers […] of comparatively junior standing"
35 -of which Gregory was the "most rising man".
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His intimate friend, the polymath Robert Leslie Ellis, was born on 25 August 1817, the youngest and most prodigious of the six children of Francis Ellis of Bath (1772 . 37 As a promising undergraduate matriculating at Cambridge in 1836 he was a pupil of George Peacock (1791 Peacock ( -1858 , the author of the Treatise on Algebra (1830), and the famous coach William Hopkins (1793-1866). Although Ellis was the Senior Wrangler of 1840, was elected a Fellow of Trinity College in October of the same year and acted as the Moderator (1844) and Examiner (1845) of the Mathematical Tripos, he died in 1859 as a layman. Ellis edited several numbers of the CMJ and contributed some 22 papers and notes on topics ranging from functional, algebraical and differential equations to magnetism and conic sections.
38 "Today an obscure and largely forgotten figure", 39 Ellis was the editor of the philosophical volumes of the collected works of Bacon and one of the earliest advocates of the so-called frequency theory of probability. 40 Later in his life, Ellis's aim was to either enter the political life of his home town, Bath, or to prepare for the legal profession -but he gave up these ambitions when his worldly position was unexpectedly altered. In an obituary of 1860 published in the February edition of The Athenaeum, an anonymous author wrote that a great part of Ellis's memoir 44 of his friend, Gregory, "may be applied, with mere change of name, to himself" -not only their "tastes", "pursuits" and "mode of life" but "unfortunately also the premature interruption by death of their usefulness" were much alike. 45 This comparison was nuanced by emphasising a difference in character: [Gregory] had less charm of manner, but more energy of action. A shade of eccentricity was perceptible in [him] , which in Ellis was entirely absent.
[…] Both were endowed with a remarkable breadth of understanding, but Ellis surpassed his northern friend in delicacy of discrimination, and probably in the range of his resources. Gregory […] , from his eminently practical turn of mind, possessed more of that kind of wisdom on which depends success in a profession, and […] the career of scientific discovery. Ellis […] , never compromising his convictions, might have exercised, had he lived, a more subtle influence on the minds of his contemporaries. 46 Another difference was that Ellis, in contrast to Gregory, repeatedly embarked upon "metaphysical speculations [about] that debatable ground which lies on the frontiers of Mathematics and Metaphysics" 47 -something which he supposedly did with "a remarkable degree [of] mental disinvoltura [and] fearlessness". 48 Although they did not resemble each other in mind or manner, there was a likeness between Gregory and Ellis insofar as both "were good mathematicians, real philosophers and lovers of truth". 49 Despite the fact that Ellis's "manner was not such as to encourage rapid intimacy", 50 it was in 1840 -the year in which he became Senior Wrangler and, like Gregory, 51 was elected Fellow of Trinity College -that the two became intimate friends.
52 When Greatheed and Smith, the co-founders of the CMJ, left Cambridge, and Gregory -who by that time had already had his first attack of illness -was forced to do all the editing work single-handedly, Ellis, 53 together with his intimate friend Walton, immediately took office and edited part of the journal's third and fourth volumes, which appeared in 1844 and 1845.
54 After Gregory's death in February 1844 it was Ellis who was involved, albeit passively due to the poor state of his own health, in the broadening of the journal's readership and the appointment -at the end of June 1845 -of Thomson as its new editor. 55 
Gregory, Ellis and the Cambridge Mathematical Journal
The CMJ was the product of a young group of high-ranked Wranglers aiming to advance pure mathematics without the formal mandate of the Cambridge examination system that produced them, and beyond the confines of the established Transactions of several British scientific societies. 56 Its founding editors approached mathematics as a progressive subject, and with the publication of "abstracts of important […] papers that have appeared in the Memoirs of foreign Academies" they aimed to keep British mathematicians up to date with the "progressive state of Mathematical science". 57 Furthermore, by opting for the rapid publication of short (and anonymous) 58 papers, they also promoted unknown young researchers who wanted to devote themselves exclusively to mathematics to pursue original work and develop novel ideas. 59 Where the first generation of reformers associated with the Analytical Society established an intellectual framework for the renewal of British mathematics, 60 the organisational and professionalising efforts of the second generation of reformers of the CMJ made it possible to explore -and, eventually, overthrow -the limits of Peacock's presentation of this framework in his Treatise on Algebra.
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Together with Smith, Walton, and Thomson, Gregory and Ellis were the main contributors to the first four volumes -both providing more than 20 papers which encompassed pure mathematics, plane and solid geometry, (analytical) geometry of two and three dimensions, algebra, trigonometry, differential and integral calculus and the calculus of finite differences, as well as topics in mathematical physics such as light, sound, heat, electricity, magnetism and hydrostatics. But it was Greatheed who, with his "On General Differentiation" of 1837, initiated what was to become the journal's main endeavour -namely the transmission of mathematical ideas and discussion on the so-called "method" or "calculus" of operations and the defence of its legitimacy and usefulness in pure mathematics and physical subjects.
62 Also in this specific context, Gregory and Ellis -responding to and making use of the findings put forward in each other's articles -took the lead. It was to their conversation about the "calculus of operations" that many other upcoming mathematicians responded by exploring and further developing the method, whilst creating a research area of fundamental importance to the development of a particularly British approach to algebra.
The "calculus of operations"
The idea of the separation of symbols of operations from symbols of quantity first appeared in the pages of the short-lived Memoirs of the Analytical Society.
63 While Continental mathematicians such as Lagrange, Cauchy, Louis François Antoine Arbogast (1759-1803) and Francois-Joseph Servois (1768-1847) "never really trusted the [inductive] method", 64 it was ever-present in the attempts of the members of the Analytical Society to leave behind the Newtonian fluxional calculus and notation, and connect with a "century of foreign improvement" in the differential calculus.
65 Importantly, after the demise of their Analytical Society, Babbage, Herschel and Peacock turned away from the calculus of operations, but it was revived by the new generation of mathematicians of the CMJ.
66 The first number of this journal contained a paper written by Greatheed, who was also the author of the first contribution to the topic since Herschel's series of articles from 1814 to 1822. 67 In his "New Method of Solving Equations of Partial Differentials" of 1837, Greatheed wrote that the assumption that symbols of operations could be treated as if they were symbols of quantity has so far as I know, been hitherto applied only to the calculus of finite differences, and to the differential calculus where both are involved. It appears to me that if any much greater eminence than that to which analysis has already been brought, remains to be attained by it, that process is the most obvious and likely path. 68 Greatheed's explanation of the method "was a pragmatic one, that is, that it yielded a correct solution", 69 and upon reading the paper Gregory soon devoted himself to its rigorous justification. The CMJ's spreading of "the gospel of the calculus of operations" 70 took the form of an appeal for its applicability in both "mixed" and "pure" mathematics. Where Gregory, Walton, Smith and others showed that it could be applied to problems in, for example, geometry, mechanics and theories of the motion of heat and pendulums etc., 71 Gregory and Ellis applied it to linear differential equations with constant coefficients, finite difference equations, (partial) differential equations and, of course, "symbolical algebra". 
Symbolical algebra
Gregory and Ellis recognised Peacock as "the only writer in this country who has attempted to write a system of algebra founded on a consideration of general principles".
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His Treatise on Algebra of 1830 and "Report on the Recent Progress and Present State of Certain Branches of Analysis" of 1833 were, indeed, "jointly responsible, almost singlehandedly, for the foundational debate on the nature of mathematics in general, and algebra in particular" 74 in the 1830s and 1840s. Peacock had formulated his system of arbitrary symbols, signs and laws as a middle way between two very different approaches to algebra -the "generalised arithmetic" approach of Francis Maseres (1731-1824) and William Frend (1757-1841) on the one hand and the "pure analysis" approach of his friend Babbage on the other. 75 The former "proposed sacrificing whole realms of algebraic activity for the sake of preserving for mathematics a solid, […] , truth governed foundational system" 76 or, vice versa, reduced algebra to an arithmetic in which "symbols stood only for nonnegative numbers and signs denoted strictly arithmetical operations".
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The latter "insisted on draining analysis of all meaning and content for the sake of grounding mathematics anew by means of a system pertaining exclusively to pure form and process". 78 Peacock's solution was to view algebra as consisting of two antithetical parts, namely "arithmetical algebra" and "symbolical algebra". Despite the fact that his aim was to establish symbolical algebra as a "science of symbols and their combinations, constructed upon its own rules which may be applied to arithmetic […] by interpretation", 79 Peacock insisted that "[t]hough […] arithmetical algebra does not furnish an adequate foundation for […] symbolical algebra, it necessarily suggests its principles". 80 Peacock's belief that "no views of the nature of Symbolical Algebra can be correct" if they make "the selection of its rules of combination […] independent of arithmetic" 81 was demonstrative of his acceptance of the "watered-down, bottom-up dependency of symbolical on arithmetical algebra that would somehow allow [one] to meaningfully ground the former in the latter" 82 via the notorious "principle of the permanence of equivalent forms". 83 Taken together, Peacock's algebra was nothing but a generalised arithmetic, that is, a symbolical algebra limited to arithmetically admissible quantities.
Gregory's "On the Real Nature of Symbolical Algebra" was an attempt to synthesise and then generalise Peacock's symbolical algebra and Adrien-Quentin (Abbé) Buée's (1748 Buée's ( -1826 and John Warren's (1796-1852) geometrical representation of negative and imaginary (or complex) numbers on the basis of what had been written on the "calculus of operations" by both Herschel and Greatheed, as well as the Continental mathematicians Joseph Fourier (1768-1830), Siméon-Denis Poisson (1781-1840) and, especially, Servois.
84 He wrote that even though " [m] uch of what follows will be found to agree with what he [Peacock] has laid down [and] with what has been written by Abbé Buée and Mr. Warren", the view put forward in the paper "is more general than that which they have done". 85 The generalisation, which took the form of the transformation of symbolical algebra into "the science which treats of the combination of operations defined not by their nature, that is by what they are or what they do, but by the laws of combinations to which they are subject", 86 resulted from the "general considerations to which I [Gregory] was led in following out the principle of the separation of symbols of operation from those of quantity". 87 Now, as is made apparent in the following section, Gregory was able to make his progressive advance towards abstraction 88 -that is, to separate arithmetical from symbolical algebra and to free the latter from its (Peacockian) restriction to quantity -by bringing on the scene geometry. More specifically, Gregory capitalised on the importance of the calculus of operations for symbolical algebra by invoking the traditional discussion of what the geometrical magnitudes generated by movement have and do not have in common with the numerical quantities of arithmetic. Furthermore, in his use of this discussion, Gregory could be said to have been indebted to the Scottish geometrical tradition and its metaphysically-inspired geometrical method of fluxions (section 3.1).
3. Gregory's symbolical algebra: the importance of geometry Gregory opened his "On the Real Nature of Symbolical Algebra" with the statement that it is true that the algebraical laws have been in many cases suggested (as Mr. Peacock has aptly termed it) by the laws of the known operations of number; but the step which is taken from arithmetical to symbolical algebra is, that, leaving out of view the nature of the operations which the symbols we use represent, we suppose the existence of classes of unknown operations subject to the same laws. We are thus able to prove certain relations between the different classes of operations [and] if we can show that any operations [are] subject to the same laws of combination as these classes, the [algebraical] theorems are true of these as included in the general case. 89 Gregory's procedure was to introduce F and f as the symbolical representations of "any operations whatever, the natures of which are unknown" and to attach these symbols "to any other symbols on which we wish to indicate that the operation […] F or f is to be performed". 90 In the remainder of his paper, Gregory postulates five classes of operations, each of which is justified with reference to the known relations between operations that suggest them. 91 For example, the first class assumes the existence of two classes of circulating operations, F and f, that are connected by the following laws:
Both "+" and "-", with the laws giving the rules for multiplication, as well as the corresponding operations of the "turning of a line [or] transferring of a point through a circumference" and the "transference of a point through a semicircumference" can be given as an interpretation of F and f. Gregory concludes that because "whatever we are able to prove of the general symbols + and -from the laws to which they are subject […] is equally true of the arithmetical [and] of the geometrical operations […] described", it holds that "there is no real analogy between the nature of the operations". 92 The relation between the operations in arithmetic and geometry is due purely "to the fact of their being combined by the same laws".
93 Another significant example is that of the (unnamed) fifth class involving two operations related by the laws (1) 
. About this class Gregory remarked that its laws are first "suggested by the known relation between certain functions of elliptic sectors" 94 and that the "most important theorem proved of [it] is that {cosx + (-) ½ sinx} n = cosnx + (-) ½ sin nx" cannot receive an interpretation in arithmetic "as it involves the operation (-) ½ . In geometry, on the contrary, it has a very distinct meaning".
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What these two examples of classes of operations demonstrate is that Gregory had enabled himself to argue that arithmetic "may be the suggesting science for many of the laws of combination [of operations] but [that] such is not necessarily the case", 96 for where the circulating operations of the first class are suggested by both arithmetical and geometrical operations, the unnamed operations of the fifth class were suggested by geometry, rather than arithmetic, and could only be interpreted or represented in geometrical terms. It is thus possible to claim that Gregory was able to break algebra's ties to arithmetic and, thereby, move beyond Peacock's system of symbolical algebra by emphasising geometry and geometrical considerations. 97 
Gregory's abstractionism and geometrical fluxional analysis
This, indeed, seems to resolve the paradox found in Smith and Wise's characterisation of Gregory, namely that if "On the Real Nature of Symbolical Algebra" earned him the title of forerunner of the modern abstract algebraists, the paper itself derived its inspirations from a Northern tradition of geometrical theory. The following two subsections elaborate the further statement that Gregory was able to put forward his progressive, analytical and technical contributions to the generalisation of symbolical algebra because of, rather than despite, the two central features of the Scottish geometrical tradition of which he was supposedly "the great hope" 98 : firstly, the abstractionist philosophy of mathematics (section 3.1.1) and, secondly, the notion of "geometrical fluxional analysis" (section 3.1.2).
Gregory and abstractionism
The abstractionist philosophy of mathematics resulted from Aristotle's answer to the problem of accounting for the existence of mathematical objects without having recourse to either the Platonic theory, which holds that these objects inhabit a supra-sensible world of Forms, or the idea that they somehow exist as physical objects. 99 Aristotle's solution was to claim that mathematical objects such as triangles, circles and numbers "are constructed out of ordinary experience but constructed in such a way that mathematics does not depend on specific features of the sensible world", 100 namely by means of abstraction from the "sensible qualities, e.g. weight and lightness, hardness and its contrary, and also heat and cold and the other sensible contrarities". 101 The idea that mathematics is concerned with abstractions or, more specifically, with "the attributes of things qua quantitative and continuous" 102 or -in the words of Thomas Aquinas (ca. 1225-1274) -with quantitative mental entities resulting from abstractio formae 103 was almost universally accepted in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 104 -especially, but not solely, among British mathematicians ranging from John Wallis (1616 Wallis ( -1703 and Isaac Barrow (1630 Barrow ( -1677 to Robert Simson (1678 -1768 , Colin Maclaurin (1698 -1746 , John Playfair and John Leslie (1766 Leslie ( -1832 . For example, where Barrow, in his Lectiones mathematicae of 1683, speaks of mathematical objects as being "mentally separated or abstracted from all specific matter, material circumstances, and accidents", 105 the famous editions of Euclid's Elements of Simson, Playfair and Andrew Bell (1753-1823) contain phrases about quantities "obtained from experience" after a "process of abstraction" that do not "possess a material existence". 106 Maclaurin's argument that this process of abstraction began with vague and indistinct notions based on comparisons of empirical objects which progressively become more definite with each new comparison is found in Simson's famous note in his own Elements, the aim of which was to throw light on the primitive […] distinction […] between a solid and its surface. By the accepted opinion, the distinction was difficult to elucidate because the solid and the surface are inseparable aspects of a body, which can never be observed in isolation from one another. This being so, it does not make sense to speak of the distinction as due simply to observation, and a way out […] was sought in the doctrine […] that the inseparable aspects are differentiated from one another by comparing one's experience of the body in one situation with one's experience of it in another, and by finding it to be in a certain way unaltered, and in another way altered. 107 Given that these and other 108 philosophico-mathematical considerations of the Scottish mathematicians remained in textbooks until the middle of the nineteenth century, 109 it is not unlikely that Gregory heard them discussed at Edinburgh or was taught them by his mentor Wallace. This at least would account for the fact that it was as a result of an abstractionist process of reasoning that Gregory was able to define symbolical algebra as "the science which treats of the combination of operations defined not by their nature, that is by what they are or what they do, but by the laws of combination to which they are subject". 110 For what Gregory did in the treatment of the five classes of operations in his "On the Real Nature of Symbolical Algebra" was, indeed, that of setting side by side geometrical operations and arithmetical operations, comparing them in respect to their likeness and their unlikeness, and finding that there are exact correspondences between the two in the midst of and in spite of their differences. He then went on to claim that symbolical algebra was concerned with what arithmetic and geometry have in common, and involved an abstraction whereby one left out [the] unique peculiarities inseparable from each, and regarded only their points of agreement. 111 Gregory was indebted to the Northern tradition of abstractionism not only because of his use of the "abstractionist technique" of reasoning by comparison "of Simson, of Maclaurin, and of his own kinsman Thomas Reid [(1710-1796) ]", 112 but also insofar as his presentation of algebra as a further abstraction from geometrical and arithmetical operations was in perfect agreement with the twofold classification of mathematics into geometry, as "the science of magnitude", and into arithmetic, as "the science of number", resulting from the abstractionist theory. 113 Where the first feature of Gregory's abstractionism explains the basis of his generalisation of Peacock's symbolical algebra, the second feature accounts for the fact that it was impossible for him to envision an algebra independent from "magnitude and multitude ([or] continuous and discrete quantity)". I endeavoured to exhibit [the] principles on which various branches of science may be symbolized -that is to say, on which their study is facilitated by expressing the operations by means of symbols […] . Among the sciences whose symbolization I there considered, that of Geometry is the most important; and on that account I wish here to treat of it more at large, especially because it appears to me that the theory of the representation of geometrical quantities by numerical symbols is usually but little attended to, and some obscurity still hangs over it. 115 Gregory thus took seriously the problematic status of algebraical geometry which, neglected by the Cambridge analysts of the Analytical Society, "had been kept alive by the geometrical tradition, in the North", 116 i.e. by the Scottish Newtonians. 117 The widespread image is that chauvinistic isolationism and a slavish adherence to a preference for geometrical demonstrations over algebraical techniques on the part of mathematicians such as James Gregory, David Gregory and John Craig(e) (1663-1731) were responsible for the sorry state of eighteenth-century British mathematics. 118 However, far from simply being "monument[s] to ancient geometry and [a] roadblock to progress in analysis", 119 both Wallis and Barrow -as well as Simson and Maclaurin and Leslie and Wallace -attempted to reconcile the old mathematics of synthetical geometry and the new mathematics of analytical algebra. 120 The work of the Scottish Newtonians was, indeed, neither ancient nor modern.
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After the publication in 1670-1671 of "his masterpiece in the new analysis, the De methodis serierum et fluxionum", 122 Newton wrote an addendum -which was later reworked into the Geometrica curvilinea (ca. 1680) -in which he reformulated the results of the "analytical method of fluxions" into a geometrical "synthetical method of fluxions" based on axioms. 123 This methodological shift towards geometry was inspired by an anti-Cartesian "admiration of the ancients as a source of wisdom" 124 and the mythical belief that his new version of the calculus of fluxions formed a rediscovery of the hidden geometrical analytical methods of the Greek geometers. 125 This myth seems to have been shared by Wallis, Barrow and Simson, who were all convinced that the ancients "possessed an analysis equivalent to the algebraical [which they] concealed [in] order to excite the greater admiration of their [synthetic geometrical] inventions". 126 Newton's calculus of fluxions -unlike Leibniz's infinitesimals and differentials -assumed that the two components of his synthetical method ("fluents" and "fluxions") "have an existence in nature" as kinematical objects generated in continuously flowing time. 127 At the same time, Newton also claimed that, insofar as it could be retranslated into the rigorous ontological basis of the synthetical method, his analytical fluxional algorithm could be obtained in a manner agreeable to ancient geometry. Taken together, the task that characterised most of the works of the Scottish Newtonians 128 In order to come to terms with the issue of algebraical geometry -that is, to solve the traditional problem of the applicability of algebra to geometry -Gregory had recourse precisely to Newtonian geometrical fluxional analysis. It was in his "On the Elementary Principles of the Application of Algebraical Symbols to Geometry" that Gregory, in words strikingly reminiscent of those of Newton, wrote:
The ideas with which we are concerned in Geometry are those of magnitude and direction. The former is of three kinds -linear, plane and solid; and the question is, of what sort of operations these may be considered as the result. Such a one I conceive to be transference in one direction; for by proper combinations of operations of this description we can represent magnitudes of all kinds […]. 130 Gregory then explained how a line, a parallelogram and a parallelepiped are to be constructed from the transference of the geometrical idea of a point:
let us assume a to be a symbol representing transference in one constant direction through a given space; then, representing the subject-point by the symbol (.) [i.e. a dot in brackets!], the compound symbol a (.) will represent a straight line as the result of transferring a point through a given space in a constant direction […] The central purpose of the construction or tracing out by continuous motion of a twodimensional figure out of a one-dimensional figure, and a three-dimensional figure out of a two-dimensional figure, was to remove the difficulty "that the same algebraic[al] expression a × b was used to cover the case both of an expression of an arithmetical kind like 3 times 2 and an expression [of a] geometrical [kind], like 3 by 2 feet".
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What the fluxional description of geometrical magnitudes as generated or nascent quantities demonstrates is the possibility of acknowledging that geometrical and arithmetical expressions are logically analogous without thereby severing the traditional distinction between discreteness and continuity. Importantly, when compared to the first generation of British mathematicians, the programme of this second generation reformer was eclectic in making advancements towards "new" or "modern" mathematics via "old" or "traditional" means. Thus, Gregory revived and further developed some of the commitments of the members of the Analytical Society -Lagrangian algebraic calculus and the method of the separation of symbols -in a way that was completely at odds with their rejection of synthetic geometrical arguments in the calculus and fluxionary notation and method; or, vice versa, Gregory was able to move beyond Peacock precisely by advancing symbolical algebra via a quasi-analytical, non-algebraical geometry of Scottish Newtonian-style fluxions and a metaphysically inspired abstractionist comparison of arithmetic and geometry. 133 
Ellis's idealism: Bacon and necessary truth
Although his contributions to symbolical algebra cannot be completely understood without taking into account the Scottish philosophico-geometrical background of which they represented a complex extension, Gregory himself rarely if ever abandoned himself to the type of "prolix metaphysical disquisitions" 134 of Simson and Maclaurin. Ellis, for his part, had "an extreme delight in knowledge for its own sake" 135 and possessed "powers distinct from those of mathematical research" 136 which were manifested most clearly in his efforts both as the editor of the philosophical works of Francis Bacon (1561-1626; see section 4.1 below) and as contributor to the report of the Cambridge University Commission of 1852 (see section 4.2 below). The (Kantian) idealist position that was elaborated in these two documents does not sit well with Smith and Wise's characterisation of Ellis as defending purely "practical" knowledge and an "anti-metaphysical", "non-hypothetical" scientific method. 
Ellis's Baconianism
It was the towering figure of the Knightbridge Professor of Moral Philosophy and Master of Trinity College William Whewell (1794 Whewell ( -1866 who, in his Philosophy of Discovery of 1860, praised Ellis for having "given a more precise view than any of his predecessors had done of the nature of Bacon's induction". 138 Whewell also emphasised that Ellis's view "amounts to much the same as the account [Whewell] had given of the positive results of Bacon's method, and the real value of that portion of his philosophy, which he himself valued most". 139 Ellis, in turn, acknowledged that Whewell's aim of renovating rather than abandoning the Baconian method of induction, in light of the historical development of modern science, was in full agreement with that of his own examination in the "General Preface". 140 Both Whewell and Ellis were of the opinion that their renovation consisted of showing not only that induction "does more than observation, inasmuch as she […] collects facts, [and] catches some connexion or relation among them [as] represented by […] ideal conceptions", 141 but also that the "application to the facts of a principle of arrangement [or] idea, existing in the mind […] antecedently to the act of induction" was aimed at, but never successfully carried through, by Bacon himself. 142 Rather than rejecting it, Whewell and Ellis, thus, set out to perfect "the Baconian induction". 143 Where Whewell wrote that the combination of "mere phenomena", or the "Colligation of Facts", and "pure ideas" or the "Explication of Conceptions" 144 already appeared in Bacon's work, Ellis argued that "Bacon never, even in idea, completed the method which he proposed". 145 The reason for Bacon's omission to "cultivate more carefully the 'ideal side' of his philosophy" 146 was, in Whewell's opinion, his lack of knowledge of the discoveries of modern science and, in that of Ellis, the realism inherent in the "doctrine of forms" on which his philosophy was grounded. Ellis's major aim in his "General Preface" was to demonstrate that Bacon's "method may be stated independently of this doctrine" and that even Bacon "himself so stated it in one of his earlier tracts". 147 Ellis introduces Bacon's own view of the place of the doctrine of forms within the two parts of the inductive method as follows:
The first part of the true inductive process is the exclusion of every nature which is not found in each instant where the given one is present, or is found where it is not present, or is found to increase where the given nature decreases, or vice versa.
[ … ] when this exclusion has been duly performed, there will in the second part of the process remain, as at the bottom, all mere opinions having been dissipated […] the affirmative Form, which will be solid and true and well defined. The exclusion of error will necessarily lead to truth.
148
The first part of the method consists of the construction, in the sense of enumerative induction, of tables of presences, absences and variations of so-called "simple natures", and the second part of the eliminative inference "on the instances in the tables to rule out possible forms that are not both necessary and sufficient for the appearance of the given nature". 149 Ellis's main objection concerned not the "tables of appearance" but the fact that Bacon assumed that the "method of exclusion" requires only an attentive consideration of each "instantia", in order first to analyse it into simple natures, and secondly to see which of the latter are to be excluded -processes which require no higher faculties than ordinary acuteness and patient diligence. There is clearly no room in this mechanical procedure for the display for subtlety or of inventive genius. Bacon's method therefore leads to certainty, and may be employed with nearly equal success by all men who are equally diligent. 150 Ellis claimed that Bacon was well aware of the difficulties involved in the idea that the method of exclusion, which was based on observed instances, could result in unobservable forms without guesswork:
Bacon admits that the Exclusiva must at first be in some measure imperfect for the Exclusiva, being the rejection of simple natures, cannot be satisfactory unless our notions of these natures are just and accurate, whereas some of those which occur […] are ill-defined and vague.
151
Bacon himself is said to have mentioned a subsidiary method -"of which the object is the formation of scientific conceptions" 152 and which he, in the Novum organum, also named induction -that is able to complete his inductive method by removing the defects of the method of exclusion. But "of the manner in which systematic induction is to be employed in the formation of conceptions we learn nothing from any part of his writings".
153
The reason for Bacon's shortcoming is twofold. On the one hand, it is "connected with the kind of realism which runs through Bacon's system" which implies that "ideas or conceptions […] reside in some sort in the objects from which we derive them" such that these not only correspond to "realities, which is of course necessary [but] may also be said adequately to represent them". 154 Because of his commitment to realism, Bacon was unable, on the other hand, to appreciate that the "progress of science continually requires the formation of new conceptions whereby new principles of arrangement are introduced among the results which had previously been obtained". 155 Given that the realist doctrine of forms can be shown to have been "an extraneous part of his philosophy", 156 Ellis was able to argue that the introduction into Baconian inductivism of the non-mechanical process of the formation of principles of arrangement that are "superinduced" 157 upon the observed phenomena is not at odds with Bacon's intentions. It was in this way that Ellis, who was "deeply committed to Kant" 158 and to the Kantian rejection of sensationalism, 159 could incorporate the ideal and mental conceptions of the individual creative mind into inductive scientific methodology -thereby finding an alternative, for example, to Herschel's influential position. 160 This, to be sure, does not sit well with Smith and Wise's twofold claim about Ellisnamely that he, on the one hand, rejected Bacon's doctrine of forms and thereby challenged Whewell's idealist notion of so-called "fundamental ideas" in science, 161 while, on the other hand, agreeing with Bacon's emphasis on the practical utility of knowledge.
162
This interpretation suggests that Ellis had an equally "practical" and "anti-metaphysical" inductivist view of mathematical conceptions; but, as is shown in what follows, Ellis upheld an "a-priorist" position in which both analytical and geometrical mathematics arose from personal contemplation of mental conceptions.
Ellis on necessary truth
The evidence that Ellis presented to the Cambridge University Commission of 1852 consisted of a brief elaboration of the statement that mathematics deals with necessary, rather than contingent, truth -the necessity of its conclusions being "absolute" in pure mathematics and "hypothetical" in applied mathematics. 163 After defining propositions that are necessarily true as those "which the mind distinctly apprehends as such" and of which "the contradictory is seen to be inconceivable", Ellis pointed out that "when we think of any simple proposition in arithmetic or geometry we perceive [that] it must of necessity be [true]". 164 But given that the intuition of "the ablest mathematician is confined within a narrower circle than that of the truths which he can prove" 165 -or, in words drawn from the "General Preface", given that the conceptions resulting from imperfect human knowledge never "exhaust the essence of the realities by which they are suggested" 166 the same cannot be said with respect to all demonstrable results in mathematics:
He [the student] may satisfy himself of the cogency of each step of the demonstration, and yet the essence of the conclusion -the fundamental principle of its truth -remains unseen […] .
In a word, his conception [is] still imperfect. But between his state of mind and that which is produced by the contemplation of any […] proposition, there is no fixed boundary […] . After long and patient thought, the reason of the truth of a proposition [will] dawn upon him; the proposition thenceforth becoming part of his own mind. 167 It is thus in the patient and attentive study of mathematical objects that the mind, conscious as it is of its own development, attains "immediate contact with necessary truth" in the form of "a complete intuition into the results which [it] is able to prove". 168 For example, in the case of probability theory, Ellis's argument is that its ideal and a priori foundations gradually emerge as a result of an intuitive contemplation of the facts of experience. 169 For the aim of grasping the "natural relations which exist among the objects of […] contemplation", both geometrical and algebraical methods may be employed since "it matters but little whether the reasoning be expressed by one set or kind of symbols or by another". 170 Like Gregory (see section 3.1.2 above), Ellis attached much importance to the traditional issue of the connection between, on the one hand, synthesis and analysis as mathematical styles of reasoning 171 and, on the other hand, geometry and algebra: "It is common to find persons in Cambridge and elsewhere who insist upon it that geometry is geometry, and [algebra is algebra]; but [this] notion of an absolute separation [is] the result of a want of familiarity with either". 172 Ellis argues that if it is supposed that when "a mathematician treats a problem geometrically [i.e. synthetically] he has to think about it for himself, whereas if he treats it symbolically [i.e. algebraically or analytically] the symbols think for him", to a mind "which has attained to a perfect mastery of [a] subject, and by which, therefore, the connexion of the data of the problem with its solution is perceived as by intuition, all the demonstrations appear to be in their essence identical".
173 Because the grounds of every form of demonstration ranging from geometrical synthesis to algebraical analysis are the same -that is, insofar as "demonstrations may be geometrical and yet in a high degree artificial and first principles may be lost in a maze of triangles no less than in a maze of equations", it is superfluous to dismiss one of them in favour of another. 174 Where William Hamilton (1788 -1856 and Whewell compare algebraical analysis to "running a rail-road through a tunneled mountain" and geometrical synthesis to "crossing the mountain on foot", 175 Ellis upholds that "in mathematical investigations there is no royal road, yet there is a nature, that namely which enables [one] to grasp the natural relations which exist among the objects of […] contemplation". 176 Like Gregory, the northern Whig Ellis wished to expose the common ground between algebraical analysis and geometrical synthesis or analysis, rather than to see them as being in opposition -but, in contrast to Gregory, Ellis did this by means of developing a philosophical position vis-à-vis the process of the acquisition of necessary knowledge.
Concluding remarks
The central aim of this paper is to examine and qualify those features of Smith and Wise's general characterisation of the second generation of British mathematical reformers that were used to describe the work of Gregory and Ellis, namely "geometrical methods" in mathematics and a "non-hypothetical" and "anti-metaphysical" scientific methodology aimed at "practical knowledge". After having briefly described both the personal and professional lives of Gregory and Ellis as well as the background of their contributions to the CMJ in sections 1 and 2, section 3 proposes a solution to the paradoxical fact that Gregory generalised symbolical algebra while still upholding the "abstractionism" and "geometrical fluxional analysis" of the Northern or Scottish Newtonian tradition in mathematics. Where the first feature allowed him to introduce geometry into the problem of the relation between arithmetic and algebra such that algebra could be shown to be an abstraction from both of these sciences, the second feature enabled him to argue that geometrical and arithmetical operations are algebraically analogous without severing the accepted distinction between continuous and discrete quantities. Given Gregory's indebtedness to these "natural philosophically" -or metaphysically -inspired features of the seventeenthand eighteenth-century mathematics of his Scottish predecessors and the complexities of their negotiation of the relationship of "old" and "new" mathematics, the label "geometrical methods" cannot straightforwardly be used to characterise his work. In section 4 it is shown that Ellis's rejection of Bacon's realist doctrine of forms neither gave rise to a dismissal of metaphysical and/or hypothetical knowledge in favour of practical and/or nonhypothetical knowledge nor challenged the importance of Whewellian ideas or conceptions in science. Ellis's idealist renovation of Baconianism consists of a reinterpretation of the process of induction in which ideal "principles of arrangement" are incorporated within the fundamental "method of exclusion". From his personal journal, contributions to probability theory and evidence from the Cambridge University Commission, it is clear that Ellis was of the opinion that these principles result from mental intuition, contemplation or, simply, the mind -and can gradually take on the shape of a priori necessary truths. The appraisal of two of the main proponents of the second generation of reformers put forward in this paper has hopefully not only made plausible that Smith and Wise's somewhat blanket description of the group's orientation is in need of revision, but also provided a contribution to this very task. This revision would of course also have to include detailed comparative analyses of the writings on mathematics of the Englishman Greatheed and the Scots Smith and Thomson (Lord Kelvin), as well as British reformers such as De Morgan, W. R. Hamilton and George Boole (1815-1864) . Other important topics that have either not been sufficiently dealt with or omitted in Smith and Wise's Energy and Empire are the influence of, for example, religious, logical and Kantian-inspired ideas on the mathematical viewpoints of the members of the second generation of reformers. The incorporation of these and other "extra-mathematical" topics within a revision of Smith and Wise's account will enrich the understanding of the history of British mathematics and further deepen the appreciation of the fact that the process of its nineteenth-century reform was a less straightforward affair than is often envisioned.
Notes
26. Given that the label "macroscopic" pertains solely to mathematical physics, and given that the intellectual partnership of Gregory and Ellis took place within (meta-)mathematics, a critical discussion of this specific label lies beyond the scope of this paper. 27. The biographical facts about Gregory can be found in Ellis, "Biographical Memoir of Gregory"; Venn, Alumni Cantabrigienses. Part II. Volume III, 141. They are reproduced in Allaire and Bradley, "Symbolical Algebra as a Foundation for Calculus"; Verburgt, "Gregory, Walton and the Development of British Algebra". 28. Grainger Stewart, The Academic Gregories, 10. 29. Thomas Reid's mother, Margaret Gregory, was the daughter of David Gregory (1625 Gregory ( -1729 of Kinairdy (1625 Kinairdy ( -1720 , the sister of the Professor at Oxford David Gregory (1659 Gregory ( -1708 , the Professor at Edinburgh University James Gregory (1666 Gregory ( -1742 (February, May, November) and each volume consisted of six parts divided over two years. 55. In the same letter to Thomson, as mentioned in note 53 above, Ellis states: "I do wish you would permit me to resign the editorship in your favour -You will in all probability be longer in Cambridge than I shall, & I should be so much better pleased to see it in your hands than in mine"; see Crilly, "The Cambridge Mathematical Journal", 471. 56. For these points, see Crilly, "The Cambridge Mathematical Journal"; Despeaux, "Launching Mathematical Research", 95-9. In the preface to the first volume of the CMJ, Gregory wrote: "it has been a subject of regret with many persons, that no proper channel existed, either in this University or elsewhere in this country, for the publication of papers on Mathematical subjects, which did not appear to be of sufficient importance to be inserted in the Transactions of any of the Scientific Societies"; see Gregory, "Preface", 1. 57. Gregory, "Preface", 2. 58. During Gregory's editorship, contributors were allowed to use pseudonyms so as to enable undergraduates to submit controversial articles without running the risk of (public) controversy -something that would greatly reduce their chances of pursuing a professional career. This practice was later abolished when Thomson took on the editorship in 1845. 59. Despeaux describes the nineteenth-century publication environment for British mathematics by writing that the Transactions of a scientific society such as the Royal Society of London "presented significant obstacles to new researchers to publish mathematics […] . For example, a mathematician wanting to publish in [the] society venues needed either to belong to the society or to have a member formally 'communicate' the paper"; see Despeaux, "Launching Mathematical Research", 95. Moreover, even in the case of successful submission, it was still possible that the author would not see the manuscript again: "[i]f the paper was not accepted by the referees for publication, the manuscript was permanently deposited in the society's archives"; see Despeaux, "'Very Full of Symbols'", 50. For an example of the refereeing process of nineteenth-century British scientific journals, see Despeaux, "Fit to Print?". 60. The underlying aim of this renewal was "to bring the mathematics taught and practiced at Cambridge back in line with state-of-the-art continental developments"; see Fisch, "Making of Peacock's Treatise", 137. 61. See Verburgt, "Gregory, Walton and the Development of British Algebra". The fact that the "natural history-inspired" approach to algebra formulated in this book was at odds with the unpublished "formalist" approach of his fellow first-generation reformer Babbage reflects the more general fact that there was no agreement among the members of the Analytical Society about their common "framework"; see Fisch, "'The Emergency Which Has Arrived'"; Fisch, "Making of Peacock's Treatise"; Fisch, "Babbage's Two Lives"; Lambert, "Natural History of Mathematics". 62. Greatheed, "General Differentiation 1". 63. See Despeaux, "'Very Full of Symbols'", 54; Koppelman, "Calculus of Operations", 175- 83. Kevin Lambert has shown that the idea of "suggestion" which provided the foundation for the "principle of equivalent forms" was inspired by Peacock's self-constructed natural history of arithmetic; see Lambert, "Natural History of Mathematics". Where the science of counting would suggest arithmetic, arithmetic would suggest arithmetical algebra which, in turn, would suggest symbolical algebra. For the purposes of this paper it is important to recognise that Peacock's neglect of geometrical considerations was, in a sense, implied in his idea of the (historical) foundation of algebra. It is pointed out in section 3 that it was precisely by introducing such geometrical considerations into the debate on the connection between algebra and arithmetic that allowed Gregory to further generalise Peacock's account. 84. Gregory refers to Buée's "Mémoire sur les quantités imaginaries" of 1806 and Warren's Treatise on the Geometrical Representation of the Square Roots of Negative Quantities of 1828. The fundamental difference between these figures was that Fourier, Poisson and many others were of the opinion "that the expressions […] obtained as solutions might be conveniently expressed by separating the symbols of operations, and not that the symbolical expressions are the proper solutions of the equations"; see Gregory, "Solution of Partial Differential Equations", 62. As Gregory had it, Servois fixed "the principles of the method on a firm and clear basis"; see Gregory, "Real Nature of Symbolical Algebra", 7. Gregory expresses his agreement with Servois's approach on various occasions in his work. 85. Gregory, "Real Nature of Symbolical Algebra", 1. 86. Ibid., 2. 87. Ibid., 1. 88. This phrase is found in Koppelman, "Calculus of Operations", 216. In Verburgt, "Gregory,
Walton and the Development of British Algebra" it is shown in what sense this "advance" took place within the framework of symbolical algebra (rather than being suggestive of a framework for abstract algebra). 89. Gregory, "Real Nature of Symbolical Algebra", 2. 90. Ibid., 3. 91. A detailed account of Gregory's five classes of operations can be found in Allaire and Bradley, "Symbolical Algebra as a Foundation for Calculus", 405-6. 92. Gregory, "Real Nature of Symbolical Algebra", [3] [4] 4. 94. Ibid., 11. 95. Ibid., 12 . As Gregory explains, "if a represents a line, and a cosx represent a line bearing a certain relation in magnitude to a, then a {cosx + (-) ½ sinx} will imply, that we have to measure a line a cosx, and from the extremity of it we are to measure another line a sinx; but in consequence of the sign of operation (-) ½ , this new line is to be measured, not in the same direction as a cosx, but turned through a right angle"; see Gregory, "Real Nature of Symbolical Algebra", 12.
